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NOTES
THE GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION
TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LONG-ARM STATUTE: PORTRAIT
OF A LEGAL MORASS
The advent of long-arm statutes based on the concept of "minimum con-
tacts"' added an important dimension to the development of civil procedure.
Long-arm statutes define the types of contacts with a forum state that render
a nonresident defendant amenable to the forum state's assertion of personal
jurisdiction. Typically, long-arm statutes enumerate such contacts as the
transaction of business within the forum state, contracting to supply or so-
licit services within the forum state, the causing of tortious injury within the
forum state, and interest in or possession of real property within the forum
state.2 The myriad approaches to obtaining personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident become more complex and challenging when the long-arm statute
involved is that of the District of Columbia.3
The unique position of the District of Columbia as the seat of our federal
government gives rise to frequent and numerous activities by nonresidents
such as lobbying, solicitation of federal funds, monitoring of legislation and
administrative or regulatory matters, as well as appearances before federal
agencies and departments. These activities have created the necessity for a
''government contacts exception" to the District of Columbia's long-arm
statute.4 This exception precludes assertion of personal jurisdiction by the
District of Columbia over a nonresident if the nonresident's only contact in
the District of Columbia is through Congress or a federal agency.5 While
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In the landmark case of
International Shoe, the Supreme Court held that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant only when the defendant has had "minimum contacts" with the
forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." Id. at 316.
2. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(1) (1981); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (Mc-
Kinney 1972 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
3. For a discussion of the District of Columbia long-arm statute, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 7, 30, 40, 57, 63, 71, 88.
4. Coalition v. Dole, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 961, 964 (D.C. May 12, 1986).
5. Environmental Research Int'l v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813
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the courts uniformly agree that such an exception exists, they are anything
but consistent as to the scope of that exception. Hence, the government con-
tacts exception has generated a great deal of controversy as courts in the
District of Columbia struggle to determine the range of its application. 6 At
the heart of the dispute is the question of whether the exception applies
broadly to all contacts with federal entities, or whether the exception is nar-
rowly confined to a nonresident's exercise of first amendment rights.7
This Note will discuss the origin and purpose of the government contacts
exception in the District of Columbia. It then will address the judicial con-
troversy that has developed over the scope of the exception. Next, the Note
will identify those government contacts definitely established as being ex-
cepted from the purview of the District of Columbia long-arm statute, and
will identify the "gray areas" relating to the government contacts exception
that continue to prolong the controversy. The Note will conclude by com-
paring the viability of the two approaches to the government contacts excep-
tion that developed in the District of Columbia and predicting the outcome
of future litigation.
I. THE GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION TO THE EXERCISE OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
"TRANSACTING ANY BUSINESS" IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA: ORIGIN AND PURPOSE
A. The District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute
The District of Columbia long-arm statute provides, in relevant part, that
"a District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a per-
son, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the
person's.., transacting any business in the District of Columbia.... "' The
statute was conceived as part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.9 Congress' purpose for the creation of the
statute was to provide the District of Columbia with a long-arm statute that
was identical to those then existing in the neighboring jurisdictions of Mary-
(D.C. App. 1976) (en banc). For further elaboration on this exception and its origins, see infra
notes 7, 30, 40, 57, 63, 71 and accompanying text.
6. Coalition, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 965.
7. The government contacts exception originated in the context of the first amendment.
See, e.g., Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932) and Layne v. Trib-
une Co., 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 572 (1934). For a complete discussion
of the origin of the government contacts exception in the District of Columbia and its relation
to the first amendment, see infra notes 40, 57, 63, 71 and accompanying text.
8. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(1) (1981).
9. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.
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land and Virginia."° Such uniformity was considered desirable in light of the
geographical proximity of the three jurisdictions and the constant traveling
between these jurisdictions by residents of the Washington metropolitan
area. Examination of judicial interpretations of the Maryland and Virginia
long-arm statutes is, therefore, relevant to determine the intended scope of
the District of Columbia statute.
Maryland and Virginia courts have interpreted their long-arm statutes to
permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the extent allowed by the due process clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 2 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the due process
standard requires a nonresident defendant to have sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" with a forum state before that defendant is subject to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by its courts. 3 The existence of sufficient "minimum
contacts" with a forum is resolved on a case-by-case basis by analyzing the
"quality and nature" of the activity or activities relied upon by the plaintiff
as establishing a basis for jurisdiction. "
4
B. The Origin of the Government Contacts Exception
in the District of Columbia
The government contacts exception originated from a series of cases that
held that the maintenance of a correspondent in the District of Columbia by
a foreign newspaper corporation did not subject that corporation to the as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction by the District.' 5 The principle was identi-
fied for the first time in Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co. 6 The Neely court
held that the collection of news material by a reporter did not constitute the
"doing of business" in the District of Columbia for purposes of the long-arm
statute then in effect.17 The court went on to highlight the roles of Washing-
ton as the center of both national government and news of national signifi-
cance, both of which made it "desirable in the public interest" that foreign
10. Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11. Id. at 1216.
12. Environmental Research Int'l v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-11
(D.C. App. 1976) (en banc).
13. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
14. Id. at 319.
15. See, e.g., Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Layne v.
Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 572 (1934).
16. 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
17. Id. at 875. Neely was decided when the predecessor to the current long-arm statute
was in effect. At that time, the statute provided that "in actions against foreign corporations
doing business in the District of Columbia all process may be served on the agent of such
corporation or such person conducting its business .... " Id. at 874.
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newspaper corporations maintain correspondents there.18 The Neely court
also noted that any other interpretation of the District of Columbia statute
would have subjected most major newspapers in the United States and
abroad to the jurisdiction of the District."9 In Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexan-
der Milburn Co.,20 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expanded
upon its earlier holding. The Mueller court held that a nonresident who
maintained an office in the District of Columbia for the sole purpose of ob-
taining information from federal departments and agencies was not amena-
ble to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the District of Columbia
courts."' The Mueller court explained that the maintenance of an office in
the District of Columbia for this purpose was analogous to the function of
news-gathering by nonresident newspaper correspondents.22 Therefore, the
court concluded that activities similar to those found in Mueller would not
constitute "doing business" within the meaning of the District of Columbia
long-arm statute.23
II. THE SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTION: THE CREATION OF
A JUDICIAL CONTROVERSY
A. The Origin of the Controversy in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals
The springboard for the current controversy over the interpretation and
scope of the government contacts exception was Environmental Research In-
ternational v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc.24  In Environmental Re-
18. Id. at 875.
19. Id. It is interesting to note that as early as 1934, as evidenced by Neely, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals was already demonstrating its aversion to turning the District of
Columbia into the "national judicial forum" that the Environmental Research court envisioned
and sought to avoid in 1976. The tone of the Neely opinion foreshadows the fear of turning the
District of Columbia into a floodgate for litigation, a concern later expressed by the Environ-
mental Research court.
20. 152 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
21. Id. at 143-44.
22. Id. at 143.
23. Id. at 144.
24. 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976) (en bane). Environmental Research involved a suit between
a District of Columbia corporation and two foreign corporations, the basis for which was
recovery of payment for services performed by the District of Columbia corporation in acting
as the foreign corporation's liaison with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at
810. The District of Columbia corporation claimed that the District of Columbia courts had
jurisdiction over the two nonresident defendants via its long-arm statute by virtue of their
"transacting business" within the statute's definition. Id. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals did not find that the defendants' activities constituted doing business for purposes of
the statute, and ruled that the District of Columbia did not have jurisdiction over the defend-
ants. Id. at 814.
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search, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals gave the exception the
broadest possible interpretation by holding that it applies to all contacts with
the District of Columbia made by nonresidents solely for the purpose of
dealing with a federal agency or department.25
The Environmental Research court's broad interpretation of the govern-
ment contacts exception was based upon two policy considerations. First,
the court emphasized the "need for unfettered access to federal departments
and agencies for the entire national citizenry."26 Second, the court relied
upon the need to prevent the District of Columbia from becoming a "na-
tional judicial forum" where personal jurisdiction could be asserted over
nonresidents "whose sole contact with the District consists of dealing with a
federal instrumentality."" The court concluded that a narrower interpreta-
tion of the exception would have the effect of defeating the policy considera-
tions inherent in the exception.28
The Environmental Research opinion conceded that the long-arm statute's
legislative history revealed a congressional intent to create a statute for the
District of Columbia that would be equivalent in its scope to those of Mary-
land and Virginia. 29 However, the court emphatically rejected the notion
that Congress' intention in adopting the new long-arm statute was to reverse
cases such as Neely,3a which held that the collection of news material by a
reporter did not constitute the "doing of business" in the District of Colum-
bia.3 Moreover, the Environmental Research court asserted that the ration-
ale for the government contacts exception is not dependent upon the
wording of the long-arm statute for its continued existence, but rather hinges
upon the unique position of the District of Columbia as the center of na-
tional government.
32
Equally important to the Environmental Research court's interpretation of
the government contacts exception was its finding that the exception would
apply even if the activity comprising contacts with the federal government
gave rise to the claim. 3 This judicial stance is significant because the
25. Id. at 813. Note that here, the court was specifically addressing visits made by em-
ployees of the defendants to EPA officials concerning the request for a federal grant which, in




29. Id. at 810.
30. Id. at 813. The Environmental Research court's contention with respect to Congress'
intent behind the statute is supported by the Margoles opinion. Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d
1212, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31. Neely, 62 F.2d at 875.
32. Environmental Research, 355 A.2d at 813.
33. Id. at 813-14.
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Supreme Court has held that one of the criteria for determining whether the
test for minimum contacts is satisfied is to determine whether a plaintiff's
cause of action arose from the activity in the forum state.34 If the premise
for a plaintiff's claim is related to the activity in the forum state, such a link
becomes one basis for justifying the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. 35 Consequently, application of the majority's inter-
pretation of the exception would lead to a direct conflict with a fundamental
premise underlying International Shoe.36 The existence of a direct conflict
may provide an explanation as to why the dissent in Environmental Research
argued against applying the exception to the facts of Environmental Re-
search. The dissent maintained that unlike Mueller and its progeny, the
claim did arise from the activities conducted in the District of Columbia.
37
In 1978, two years after the Environmental Research ruling, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals gave the government contacts exception a differ-
ent interpretation in Rose v. Silver. 38 The Rose court held that a nonresi-
dent's contacts with a federal agency in the District of Columbia through an
attorney were sufficient to subject the nonresident to personal jurisdiction.
39
Furthermore, the Rose court explained that if a nonresident is amenable to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction and traditional due process standards
are satisfied, the first amendment is the "only principled basis for exempting
a foreign defendant from suit in the District ... ."4 Although the Rose
court did not overrule the holding in Environmental Research,41 it greatly
narrowed the court's previous interpretation of the government contacts
exception.
34. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 319.
35. Id.
36. As noted in supra note 1, the fundamental premise underlying International Shoe is
that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the
defendant has had "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316.
37. Environmental Research, 355 A.2d at 813.
38. 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979). Rose involved a
suit for recovery of fees by a nonresident attorney who performed services for a foreign corpor-
ation in his capacity as a liaison for that corporation with the Food and Drug Administration.
Id. at 1369.
39. Id. at 1374.
40. Id. The court elaborated on this point in footnote 6 of the opinion, noting that histori-
cally, the government contacts exception arose in that context of protecting entities "against
claims by third parties based on transactions unrelated to the entity's special governmental
purpose in the District of Columbia." Id. at 1374 n.6.
41. It should be noted that the Rose decision was rendered by a panel of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals; hence, the holding could not and did not overrule Environmental
Research, which was decided by a full court. Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779,
786 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
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The Rose court relied upon the express wording of the District of Colum-
bia long-arm statute, and held that the sole basis for invoking the exception
was the first amendment right "to petition the government for a redress of
grievances" without fear of subjecting oneself to a lawsuit, provided the con-
tacts in the District of Columbia were limited to the exercise of that constitu-
tional right.42 In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that the
government contacts exception had served the purpose of providing a limita-
tion on the "doing business" provision of the former long-arm statute.43 Ac-
cording to the court, the reason that the exception does not have the same
effect on the current statute is that the "doing business" concept under the
old statute required a more "systematic and continuous course of conduct"
than the present "transacting any business" standard." The court stated
that such a change in the long-arm statute's language extended personal ju-
risdiction to anyone who could be reached if due process standards were
satisfied. 45 Although not denying the existence of the exception altogether,
the Rose court argued that the context of its application was now severely
limited to the assertion of first amendment rights.46 Therefore, the holdings
in Environmental Research and Rose result in a conflict between a broadly
conceived exception, which can be applied to all government contacts, ver-
sus an exception narrowly confined to a first amendment context.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia encountered the above-
noted conflict in Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt.47 In Naartex, the non-
resident's contacts with the District of Columbia consisted of lobbying ef-
forts and the maintenance of an office for monitoring legislative and
regulatory matters. The District of Columbia Circuit held that all of the
activities implicated the first amendment right to petition the government
and, therefore, also triggered the government contacts exception.4" Because
the dispute arose in a first amendment context, the Naartex court did not
have to reconcile the conflicting opinions of Rose and Environmental Re-
search. Naartex merely acknowledged that the contacts in Naartex qualified
for the exception regardless of the test used because they involved first
amendment exercises in petitioning the government. 49 However, the Naar-
42. Rose, 394 A.2d at 1374.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1373.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1374.
47. 722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
48. Id. at 787.
49. Id. It is also worth noting that the Naartex court dismissed the plaintiff's argument
that proprietary interests were not covered under the government contacts exception. The
plaintiffs contended that the defendant's lobbying activities, which consisted of an attempt to
1987]
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tex court indicated that if it had been obliged to address the scope of the
government contacts exception, the Environmental Research court's broad
application of the exception would have controlled the outcome.5°
B. Federal Court Cases-A Clear Preference for a
Broadly Interpreted Exception
Many federal court cases, in their application of the government contacts
principle, have reflected a broad interpretation of the government contacts
exception that is more consistent with the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals' holding in Environmental Research. For example, in Investment
Co. Institute v. United States,51 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that filings and other dealings with a federal agency
or department by a foreign corporation do not subject the corporation to the
assertion of personal jurisdiction.52 Moreover, the court noted that district
courts have not restricted the exception to a narrow first amendment con-
text, but rather have "simply discounted" those business activities that in-
volve the giving or receipt of information to or from the government.53 As
in Naartex, the Investment Co. court observed that even if the stricter re-
quirements of Rose were applied to these facts, first amendment protection
would extend to activities undertaken for protection of proprietary interests
as well as the exercise of the right of petition "for less mercenary reasons."54
In National Coal Association v. Clark,55 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia also drew on the broader interpretation afforded
the government contacts exception by the Naartex and Environmental Re-
search courts. National Coal reiterated the two policy considerations identi-
fied by Environmental Research,56 and held that the government contacts
favorably influence government action on an oil and gas lease, were not truly lobbying activi-
ties at all, but an effort to protect the defendant's business interests. The court maintained that
a company's defense "of their rights before a governmental body is not less a 'petition' simply
because they sought to protect their proprietary interests." Id.
50. Id. at 786. The reason for this preference was that while Environmental Research was
decided by a full court, Rose represented only a panel opinion. Since such a panel cannot issue
a holding that "conflicts materially with a prior decision of the full court," Environmental
Research would still be controlling authority on personal jurisdiction issues. Id.
51. 550 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C. 1982).
52. Id. at 1217. The court maintained that the government contacts involved here, which
consisted of filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, were "prerequisites" to the
defendant's participation in the securities industry, and could only be accomplished in the
District of Columbia. Id.
53. Id. at 1216-17.
54. Id. at 1217. See supra note 49.
55. 603 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1984).
56. Environmental Research, 355 A.2d at 813.
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exception "exempts from consideration as business transactions upon which
'long-arm' jurisdiction may be based contacts of a non-resident defendant in
this District which are made solely with the federal government.
57
In Coalition v. Dole,"s the District of Columbia Circuit again afforded a
broad interpretation to the government contacts exception. Coalition in-
volved two types of government contacts: 1) meetings between nonresidents
and federal agency officials, and 2) application for and receipt of federal
funds based upon those meetings.59 The Coalition court easily disposed of
the first issue of the meetings with federal officials by finding that they impli-
cated first amendment concerns. Therefore, the court concluded that the
meetings fell within the government contacts exception to personal jurisdic-
tion, regardless of whether the test of Environmental Research or Rose was
applied.' However, the issue of the receipt of federal funds was more diffi-
cult to resolve, as it required the court to choose between the Environmental
Research and Rose tests. The Coalition court followed Environmental Re-
search's broader interpretation of the government contacts exception, basing
its decision on the simple assertion that a panel of the court of appeals, such
as the one that decided Rose, cannot overrule an en banc decision such as
Environmental Research.6" Therefore, those contacts with federal officials,
which related to the procurement of federal funds, were excluded from con-
sideration vis-a-vis personal jurisdiction.
6 2
III. TAKING STOCK: RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS AND GRAY AREAS
A. Contacts Generally Falling Within the Exception
Although the scope of the government contacts exception has created a
great deal of confusion and controversy in the District of Columbia courts,
certain contacts are generally considered by the courts to fall within the ex-
ception. These contacts are grouped loosely under the term "information-
gathering."63 Activities such as lobbying," maintaining an office for the
57. National Coal, 603 F. Supp. at 671. As with Naartex and Hughes, National Coal
agreed that the maintenance of a government affairs office, limited in this case to verbal and
written communication with the Department of Interior, fell within the exception to the long-
arm statute. Id. at 671-72 (citation omitted).
58. 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 961 (D.C. May 12, 1986).
59. Id. at 964.
60. Id. at 965.
61. Id.; see Naartex, 722 F.2d at 786.
62. Coalition, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 965.
63. The information-gathering concept was introduced by the Mueller court in its expan-
sion of the government contacts principle to include other foreign corporations in addition to
the foreign newspaper corporations recognized as exempt from the District of Columbia long-
arm statute under Neely and Layne. Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d
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purpose of monitoring legislative and regulatory matters, 65 soliciting re-
search grants or other federal funds,66 and appearances before federal de-
partments and agencies6 7  are considered information-gathering and
therefore fall within the exception. In addition, filings and related dealings
with a federal agency, prerequisite to engaging in certain types of business or
industry, also fall within the exception.6 1 Moreover, both the Naartex 69 and
Investment Co. 70 courts ruled that the defense of a business entity's "proprie-
tary interests" before a governmental body is afforded the same exception as
the exercise of the right to petition the government for "non-commercial"
reasons. 7
1
B. Areas of Confusion and Continuing Controversy
The gray areas that continue to prolong the judicial controversy over the
scope of the government contacts exception fall into three distinct classes.
The first class involves the distinction between actually transacting business
for statutory purposes versus mere information-gathering; the second class
involves whether the activities comprising the government contacts gave rise
to or are related to the plaintiff's claim.72 Finally, the third class involves
the business relationship between the nonresident defendant and the party
representing the defendant through that party's contact with the District of
142, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Mueller was the first to recognize that the gathering of information
by a foreign corporation from government departments and agencies did not constitute the
"doing of business" for purposes of the previous long-arm statute. Id. Since Mueller, a
number of courts, including Naartex v. Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984); Investment Co. Inst. v. United States, 550 F. Supp.
1213, 1216-17 (D.D.C. 1982); Hughes v. A.H. Robbins Co., 490 A.2d 1140, 1145 n.4 (D.C.
1985); and Environmental Research Int'l v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, 355 A.2d 808, 813
(D.C. 1976) (en banc), have categorized those contacts in the District of Columbia that involve
information-gathering from the federal government.
64. Naartex, 722 F.2d at 787.
65. Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1145 n.4.
66. Beachboard v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 475 A.2d 398, 401 (D.C. 1984).
67. National Coal, 603 F. Supp. at 672.
68. Investment Co., 550 F. Supp. at 1217.
69. 722 F.2d at 787.
70. 550 F. Supp. at 1217.
71. The proprietary interests argument originated in Naartex. In that case, the plaintiff
attempted to argue that the nonresident defendants made administrative appearances before
the Department of Interior in order to protect their oil and gas lease, and not for the purpose
of engaging in lobbying activities. Naartex, 722 F.2d at 787. Therefore, the plaintiff argued,
the exception should not apply. Id. The Naartex court rejected this argument, holding that
the nonresident defendants' attempt to protect their proprietary interests from an unfavorable
regulatory decision still qualified as a first amendment exercise in petitioning the government.
Id.




With regard to the first category of exceptions, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Beachboard v. Trustees of Columbia University74 held
that where a foreign corporation's only contact with the District of Colum-
bia is soliciting research grants and other federal funds, and where the plain-
tiff's suit does not relate to those activities, the long-arm statute's
"transacting business" section does not apply.75 In Hughes v. A. H. Robbins,
Co.,76 the court again dealt with a nonresident corporate defendant who es-
tablished an office for monitoring congressional legislation.77 The Hughes
court found these limited activities to be clearly within the exception. 78 Fur-
ther, Hughes distinguished between those contacts that involve "informa-
tion-gathering" as opposed to those that constitute the actual transaction of
business, such as entering commercial contracts with the federal govern-
ment.79 The latter, according to Hughes, would qualify as contacts within
International Shoe's meaning and would, thereby, trigger assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.80 As the Hughes court noted,
all of the government contracts pertinent to that case had been negotiated
and executed outside of the District of Columbia.8'
In a similar manner to Hughes, the Investment Co. court said that any
application of the government contacts principle for purposes of establishing
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident could exclude those business activi-
ties that involved the provision of information to or receipt of information
from the government.82 National Coal, Coalition, and Environmental Re-
search made the broadest statements concerning the scope of the exception,
asserting that all contacts made solely with the federal government are ex-
empt from being considered business transactions for personal jurisdiction
purposes. This interpretation originated with Environmental Research and
was bolstered by Naartex, which stated that Environmental Research con-
trols because it represents a full court decision, whereas Rose was rendered
by a panel.83 Coalition expanded beyond the recognized exemption covering
73. Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1370-72 (D.C. 1978), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C.
1979).
74. 475 A.2d 398 (D.C. 1984).
75. Id. at 401.
76. 490 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1985).
77. Id. at 1143.




82. 550 F. Supp. at 1216.
83. 722 F.2d at 786.
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the solicitation of federal funds,84 and proclaimed that the exception also
would cover the procurement of funds.8 5
The District of Columbia courts likewise are divided over the second cate-
gory of exceptions involving the issue of whether the fact that the plaintiff's
claim is related to the activities comprising the government contacts should
affect the exception. According to the Beachboard court, if the plaintiff's
claim arises from the activities relating to the government contacts, the long-
arm statute can be invoked as a basis for personal jurisdiction.16 Like
Beachboard, Hughes also touched on the relationship between the cause of
action and the government contacts.8 7 In a departure from Beachboard, the
Hughes court concluded that those government contacts that were unrelated
to the cause of action could also be considered in the minimum contacts
equation, but that they should be given far less weight than contacts that
were related to the claim.88 As previously noted, the dissent in Environmen-
tal Research argued against allowing application of the exception where a
claim arose from the activities conducted in the District of Columbia. 9
However, as the majority understood Mueller and its progeny, a denial of
personal jurisdiction should be based upon the nature of the activities them-
selves-the government contacts-and not upon the relationship between
the suit and the activities.90
With respect to the third category, the Rose court focused very closely on
the business relationship between the nonresident defendant and the party
representing that defendant through its contacts with the District of Colum-
bia. Rose concerned an agency relationship whereby an attorney was sent by
a foreign corporation to set up an office in the District of Columbia to nego-
tiate with and potentially litigate against a federal agency. 9 The Rose court
held that the foreign corporation had purposefully availed itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities in the District of Columbia because the attorney
had moved to the District of Columbia at the direct instigation of the client
to act as the client's fiduciary.92 Rose made an important distinction be-
tween the "unilateral activity" of the independent contractor, which charac-
terized Environmental Research, and the agency relationship in Rose.
According to the court, the "lack of control" aspect over the independent
84. Beachboard v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 475 A.2d 398, 401 (D.C. 1984).
85. 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 961, 965 (D.C. May 12, 1986).
86. 475 A.2d at 401.
87. 490 A.2d at 1146.
88. Id.
89. 355 A.2d at 816-17 (Fickling, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 813-14 (opinion of Harris, J.).
91. 394 A.2d at 1369.
92. Id. at 1371-72.
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contractor in Environmental Research was a far cry, from the "right to di-
rect and control" the functions carried out by the corporation's agent.9 3
Therefore, the court reasoned, the agent had transacted business for the cor-
poration within the meaning of the long-arm statute.94 Consequently, ac-
cording to the Rose court, if a fiduciary relationship is present and the
nonresident defendant provides for direct control over the agent's activities
in the District of Columbia, then the contacts constitute "transacting busi-
ness" for long-arm statute purposes. Such direct control thereby renders the
nonresident defendant amenable to suit in the District of Columbia."
IV. COMMENTARY ON ROSE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH: THE
CHOICE BETWEEN UNDESIRABLE EXTREMES
As previously discussed, the federal district courts, have not followed the
narrow interpretation of the government contacts exception articulated in
Rose.96 Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not yet
addressed the conflict, it is likely that the court will eventually resolve it in
favor of a broad interpretation of the exception. The crux of the difficulty
with defining the scope of the exception lies in the fact that neither Environ-
mental Research nor Rose provide a viable solution to the controversy. Both
represent undesirable, impracticable extremes that ought to be avoided by
the courts.
The undesirability of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision
in Rose is underscored with an analysis of the types of activities constituting
the government contacts in the foregoing cases. The limited contacts made
by the nonresident corporations and other entities in these cases included
lobbying,9 7 maintenance of a District of Columbia office for the sole purpose
of monitoring legislative and/or regulatory matters,9 8 solicitation 99 and/or
receipt" of research grants and various other federal funds, and the filing
and processing of applications to engage in a certain type of business, when
the filings could only be accomplished in the District of Columbia.'0 1 None
of these varied activities has anything to do with the first amendment right
to petition the government for redress of grievances. Nor did any of these
93. Id. at 1372.
94. Id. at 1371.
95. Id.
96. Rose, 394 A.2d at 1374.
97. Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied
467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
98. Hughes v. A.H. Robbins Co., 490 A.2d 1140, 1145 n.4 (D.C. 1985).
99. Beachboard v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 475 A.2d 398, 401 (D.C. 1984).
100. Coalition v. Dole, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 961, 965 (D.C. May 12, 1986).
101. Investment Co. Inst. v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (D.D.C. 1982).
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activities, with the possible exception of Rose, trigger or contribute to the
claim that gave rise to the suit.' °2 Yet, according to the Rose rationale, none
of these activities would qualify for the government contacts exception to the
District of Columbia long-arm statute."0 3 Given the unique position of the
District of Columbia as a forum for frequent and necessary dealings between
nonresident and federal entities, it is inconceivable that merely on the basis
of these contacts, individuals and corporations would subject themselves to
personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. Rose attempts to restrict
application of the government contacts exception within too narrow a con-
text to be practicable in the District of Columbia.
Policy considerations also underscore the advantages of a broad interpre-
tation of the exception. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
identified two policy considerations inherent in the government contacts ex-
ception. " If the twin objectives of: (1) encouraging open access to and free
communication with the federal government, and (2) preventing the District
of Columbia from becoming a floodgate for litigation based solely on deal-
ings with federal entities are to be achieved, then a broadly applied exception
is the vehicle by which to accomplish them. Adherence to Rose would ex-
pand the amenability of nonresidents to suit, and would ultimately have a
stifling effect on the willingness of nonresidents to deal with federal officials
and agencies. Worse yet, the application of Rose has the potential to turn
the District of Columbia into the unwelcome "national judicial forum" that
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has sought to avoid. 103
On the other hand, Environmental Research's interpretation of the gov-
ernment contacts exception offers an equally undesirable alternative with re-
spect to its position on the relationship between the activities comprising the
government contacts and the plaintiff's claim. The Environmental Research
court held that the exception would apply even if the claim arose from the
activities conducted in the District of Columbia."0 6 Such an interpretation is
in direct conflict with Supreme Court precedent which has held that the
relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation is of central
102. Arguably, even the government contacts in Rose were not per se related to the litiga-
tion that followed. The attorney who acted as a fiduciary for the foreign corporation sued to
recover fees due for the legal services he performed in the District of Columbia. 394 A.2d at
1369. Therefore, the claim really stemmed from the corporation's refusal to pay, and not from
the actual activities comprising the government contacts.
103. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
104. Environmental Research Int'l v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C.
1976) (en banc).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 813-14.
[Vol. 36:745
Government Contacts Exception
concern with respect to the inquiry into personal jurisdiction. 107 To satisfy
the requirements for minimum contacts, and thereby assert personal juris-
diction, the Supreme Court has ruled that there must be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum state.' 0 8 If there is a nexus between the parties, the
litigation, and the forum state in a way that justifies bringing the parties
before a state tribunal, the requirements of International Shoe and its prog-
eny are met, and the state can assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent defendant.' 09
It is clear from the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of mini-
mum contacts that the application of an absolute exception, such as the one
fashioned by the Environmental Research court, conflicts with established
legal precedent that is binding on the District of Columbia courts. For ex-
ample, to assert that a corporation maintaining an office for monitoring con-
gressional affairs would not be liable to a local landlord for arrears in rent is
absurd. Similarly, to preclude a District of Columbia resident from suing for
injuries sustained in a car accident in which a nonresident lobbyist is at fault
is equally untenable. Therefore, while it is likely that a broad interpretation
will guide future decisions rendered by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, Supreme Court precedent dictates that the interpretation will be
fashioned from some middle ground between Environmental Research and
Rose. The Hughes and Beachboard cases, which were decided nearly a dec-
ade after Environmental Research, may signal a judicial retreat on the part of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from the extremes of Environ-
mental Research and Rose. Both the Hughes ' 0 and Beachboard"'. courts
recognized that, notwithstanding the government contacts exception, per-
sonal jurisdiction can be asserted when a plaintiff's claim arises from activi-
ties relating to government contacts." 2 Thus, the holdings in those two
cases are more in line with Supreme Court precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
The opinions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Rose and
Environmental Research define the parameters of the government contacts
controversy within the District of Columbia courts. In view of the District
of Columbia's important and unique position as the seat of the federal gov-
107. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
108. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
109. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-09.
110. 490 A.2d at 1145-46.
111. 475 A.2d at 401.
112. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
1987]
760 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 36:745
ernment, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is certain to resolve the
conflict soon. To date, federal courts in the District of Columbia have fa-
vored Environmental Research, while the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals has reflected far less uniformity. The variety and increasing frequency
of government contacts made by nonresident corporations and individuals
require an exception that is broad rather than narrow in scope. Yet, how-
ever broadly the scope of the government contacts exception may be defined
in future decisions, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is more likely
to be guided by consideration of Supreme Court precedent as it relates to the
assertion of personal jurisdiction, and hence, more likely to avoid the ill-
advised extremes of Rose and Environmental Research.
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